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John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig von Mises on 
Probability  
 
 
Abstracto 
 
Los paradigmas económicos de Ludwig von Mises por 
una parte, y de John Maynard Keynes por otra, han sido 
correctamente reconocidos como contradictorias a nivel 
teórico, y como antagonistas, con respecto a sus 
implicancias políticas prácticas y públicas. Desde el 
punto de vista característico también han sido 
reivindicadas por sectores de oposición del espectro 
político. Aún así, las respectivas visiones de estos 
autores con respecto al significado e interpretación de 
la probabilidad, muestra una afinidad conceptual más 
estrecha que los que se ha reconocido en la literatura. 
Se ha argumentado especialmente que en algunos aspectos 
importantes, la interpretación de Ludwig von Mises del 
concepto de probabilidad, muestra una estrecha afinidad 
con la interpretación de probabilidad desarrollada por su 
oponente John Maynard Keynes, que con las maneras de ver 
la probabilidad respaldadas por su hermano Richard von 
Mises. Sin embargo, también existen grandes diferencias 
entre los puntos de vista de Ludwig von Mises y aquellos 
de John Maynard Keynes con respecto a la probabilidad. 
Uno de ellos se destaca principalmente: cuando John 
Maynard Keynes aboga por un punto de vista monista de la 
probabilidad, Ludwig von Mises defiende un punto de vista 
dualista de la probabilidad, de acuerdo con lo cual, el 
concepto de probabilidad recibe dos significados 
diferentes, y en donde cada uno de ellos es válido en un 
área o contexto en particular. Se concluye que tanto John 
Maynard Keynes como Ludwig von Mises presentan puntos de 
vista claramente diferenciados con respecto al 
significado e interpretación de la probabilidad. 
 
 
Códigos JEL: B00; B40; B49; B53; C00 
 
Palabras clave: Metodología General; Metodología 
austríaca; Metodología Keynesiana; Conceptos de 
probabilidad cuantitativos y cualitativos: Significado e 
Interpretación; Interpretación de frecuencia; 
Interpretación lógica; John Maynard Keynes; Ludwig von 
Mises; Richard von Mises;   
 3
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The economic paradigms of Ludwig von Mises on the 
one hand and of John Maynard Keynes on the other have 
been correctly recognized as antithetical at the 
theoretical level, and as antagonistic with respect to 
their practical and public policy implications. 
Characteristically they have also been vindicated by 
opposing sides of the political spectrum. Nevertheless 
the respective views of these authors with respect to the 
meaning and interpretation of probability exhibit a 
closer conceptual affinity than has been acknowledged in 
the literature. In particular it is argued that in some 
relevant respects Ludwig von Mises´ interpretation of the 
concept of probability exhibits a closer affinity with 
the interpretation of probability developed by his 
opponent John Maynard Keynes than with the views on 
probability espoused by his brother Richard von Mises. 
Nevertheless there also exist significant differences 
between the views of Ludwig von Mises and those of John 
Maynard Keynes with respect to probability. One of these 
is highlighted more particularly: where John Maynard 
Keynes advocated a monist view of probability, Ludwig von 
Mises embraced a dualist view of probability, according 
to which the concept of probability has two different 
meanings each of which is valid in a particular area or 
context. It is concluded that both John Maynard Keynes 
and Ludwig von Mises presented highly nuanced views with 
respect to the meaning and interpretation of probability. 
 
JEL codes: B00; B40; B49; B53; C00 
 
Keywords: General Methodology; Austrian Methodology; 
Keynesian Methodology; Quantitative and Qualitative 
Probability Concepts: Meaning and Interpretation; 
Frequency Interpretation; Logical Interpretation; John 
Maynard Keynes; Ludwig von Mises; Richard von Mises;   
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I. Introduction 
 
 
The complex issues relating to the interpretation 
and meaning of different concepts of probability and the 
legitimate scope of their useful application in the 
social sciences and in economics belong to the more 
controversial topics within the sub-field of economic 
methodology. Several of the most influential economists 
have expounded outspoken views about the matter. Thus it 
is probably no exaggeration to assert that John Maynard 
Keynes´ second-best-known book – after his The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money - is his A 
Treatise on Probability. Ludwig von Mises´ views about 
probability have been no less influential within the 
context of the Austrian School and even beyond. In this 
respect some commentators have claimed that Ludwig von 
Mises basically embraced the frequency interpretation of 
probability of his brother Richard von Mises1, thus 
suggesting that Ludwig von Mises´ views on probability 
are no less antagonistic to those of John Maynard Keynes 
than his views on economic theory and public policy. This 
latter view will here be challenged. While it is not 
contended that any historical evidence points to any 
direct historical influence between the views on 
probability of these two authors, it will be argued that 
in some relevant respects Ludwig von Mises´ views with 
respect to the meaning and interpretation of probability 
exhibit a closer conceptual affinity with the views of 
John Maynard Keynes about probability than with the views 
concerning probability of his brother Richard von Mises.  
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As regards the views about probability of Ludwig von 
Mises, it is undeniably true that these display 
considerable nuance and that they can be considered as 
being of a sui generis variety. Even if Ludwig von Mises´ 
views on probability exhibit a closer conceptual affinity 
with Keynes´ philosophy of probability than with the 
frequency interpretation espoused by his brother Richard 
von Mises, an important difference between the views of 
Ludwig von Mises and those of John Maynard Keynes in this 
respect will nevertheless be acknowledged.  
 
 
II. The summa divisio in the philosophy of probability: 
epistemic versus objective interpretations of probability 
 
Interpretations of probability are commonly divided into 
(1) epistemological (or epistemic) and (2) objective. 
Epistemological interpretations of probability take 
probability to be concerned with the knowledge (or 
belief) of human beings. On this approach, any 
probability assignment describes a degree of knowledge, a 
degree of rational belief, a degree of belief, or 
something of this sort. The approaches of both Ludwig von 
Mises and John Maynard Keynes belong to this category. 
Objective interpretations of probability, by contrast, 
take probability to be a feature of the objective 
material world, which has nothing to do with human 
knowledge or belief. The theory of Richard von Mises 
belongs to this category.2  
Despite the fact that Ludwig von Mises himself 
clearly embraced what must be considered an epistemic 
view regarding the interpretation of probability, the 
objectivist view has been propounded by several Austrian 
economists, especially among those belonging to the 
praxeological camp. These authors apparently take it for 
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granted that Ludwig von Mises had simply adopted the 
philosophy of probability of his brother Richard von 
Mises. Thus in a characteristic passage of Man, Economy, 
and State M.N. Rothbard wrote: 
 
“The contrast between risk and uncertainty has been 
brilliantly analyzed by Ludwig von Mises. Mises has shown 
that they can be subsumed under the more general 
categories of “class probability” and “case probability”. 
“Class probability” is the only scientific use of the 
term “probability”, and is the only form of probability 
subject to numerical expression.”3  
 
 
In the two footnotes accompanying this passage M.N. 
Rothbard refers both to Ludwig von Mises´ discussion in 
Human Action, and to Richard von Mises´ Probability, 
Statistics, and Truth, thus conflating the views of the 
two brothers.4   
Views like the ones expressed by M.N. Rothbard are 
often, if not always, accompanied, and rather 
consistently, by a rejection of quantitative methods for 
the conduct of applied research in economics. Again M.N. 
Rothbard tells the story of how he came to decide to 
leave the world of statistics in rather dramatic terms:  
 
“After taking all the undergraduate courses in 
statistics, I enrolled in a graduate course in 
mathematical statistics at Columbia with the eminent 
Harold Hotelling, one of the founders of modern 
mathematical economics. After listening to several 
lectures of Hotelling, I experienced an epiphany: the 
sudden realization that the entire “science” of 
statistical inference rests on one crucial assumption, 
and that that assumption is utterly groundless. I walked 
out of the Hotelling course, and out of the world of 
statistics, never to return.”5  
 
According to Professor Rothbard the questionable 
assumption is the following:  
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“In the science of statistics, the way we move from our 
known samples to the unknown population is to make one 
crucial assumption: that the samples will, in any and all 
cases, whether we are dealing with height or unemployment 
or who is going to vote for this or that candidate, be 
distributed around the population figure according to the 
so-called “normal curve.”6  
 
 
Statements like these have been both severely criticized 
and misunderstood. Thus David Ramsey Steele, in his 
review of Justin Raimondo´s An Enemy of the State: The 
Life of Murray N. Rothbard writes: 
 
“If the young Rothbard really had found something that 
refuted all statistical theory, this would be a momentous 
discovery, and a great consolation to tobacco producers. 
But, 60 years on, the edifice of statistics has not 
registered any tremors. 
 
In the Rothbard-Raimondo account, statisticians accept 
the bell curve because of a single example, the 
distribution of hits around the bull´s eye on a target. 
In fact, statisticians don´t view the bell curve as 
sacrosanct. Since a great many phenomena are, as a matter 
of fact, so close to normally distributed that the 
assumption of normal distribution will yield correct 
predictions, normal distribution can be treated as an 
empirical generalization and a useful instrument. 
 
Alternatively, normal distribution can be strictly 
derived by the Central Limit Theorem, which shows that 
where some variable is influenced by a large number of 
unrelated random variables, that variable will be 
normally distributed. This result holds subject to 
certain conditions, which are very widely, but not 
universally, encountered. Statisticians are open to the 
possibility of non-normal distributions where these 
conditions don´t apply. It doesn´t seem likely that 
Rothbard successfully debunked all of statistics around 
1942.”7  
 
This interpretation of Rothbard´s position is certainly 
questionable. It doesn´t seem likely after all that 
Rothbard was intent upon questioning the mathematical 
validity of the Central Limit Theorem or of any other 
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theorem of formal probability calculus. It may still 
remain true, however, that in contexts where random 
collectives do not exist (that is, contexts characterized 
by lack of independent repetitions), as will often be the 
case in economics, objective probabilities cannot be 
used. Given that Rothbard embraced an objective, 
frequency interpretation of numerical probability, his 
rejection of statistics is a defensible and logically 
consistent corollary. Moreover the rejection of the use 
of objective probabilities in economics is in agreement 
with the conclusions of some of the most recent research 
about these matters, and with general arguments for 
interpreting probabilities in economics as 
epistemological rather than objective.8  
 
It is worth pointing out that for quite some time the 
objectivist view had also been rather influential in 
certain Marxist-Leninist circles. Whereas the objectivist 
view had indeed been dominant in statistical theory and 
practice throughout most of the previous century, it was 
in particular in certain Soviet writings that attempts 
had been made to provide the objectivist view with 
supposedly Marxist-Leninist philosophical underpinnings, 
and to dismiss the subjective characterization of 
probability as inevitably leading to subjective idealism.9  
The critical issue we want to examine here, however, 
is whether the precepts of praxeological methodology and 
epistemology indeed entail an exclusive commitment to the 
objectivist viewpoint. An examination of Ludwig von 
Mises´ viewpoint in this respect has not convinced us 
that this is actually the case. 
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In fact, and as mentioned briefly already, Ludwig von 
Mises´ views with respect to the interpretation of 
probability, are more akin to Keynes´ views than to the 
philosophy of probability of his brother Richard von 
Mises. In order to substantiate this view, we will 
compare Ludwig von Mises´ position concerning this matter 
with the positions both of John Maynard Keynes and of 
Richard von Mises. The two main approaches to the 
interpretation of probability theory which will be 
considered here are thus the frequency interpretation, as 
developed systematically by Richard von Mises, and the 
logical interpretation, as developed systematically by 
John Maynard Keynes.10 
In the third and fourth sections hereafter I present 
a general characterization of the views on probability of 
these two authors. In section V I argue that the thesis 
that Ludwig von Mises embraced the objective frequency 
interpretation of probability of his brother Richard von 
Mises is disputable in view of a number of Ludwig von 
Mises´ own statements with respect to this subject 
matter. 
In the sixth section I examine further whether and 
in what respects Ludwig von Mises´ views on probability 
indeed exhibit a conceptual affinity with John Maynard 
Keynes´ interpretation of probability. In the seventh 
section an important difference between the respective 
views about probability of Ludwig von Mises and of John 
Maynard Keynes is highlighted.  
 
III. Richard von Mises´ objective approach to 
probability: the frequency interpretation  
 
The principal goal of Richard von Mises was to make 
probability theory a science similar to other sciences. 
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According to the frequency view probability theory is 
considered a science of the same order as, say, geometry 
or theoretical mechanics. He criticizes the view that 
probability can be derived from ignorance: 
 
“It has been asserted - and this is no overstatement -
that whereas other sciences draw their conclusions from 
what we know, the science of probability derives its most 
important results from what we do not know.”11  
 
Probability should be based on facts, not their 
absence. The frequency theory relates a probability 
directly to the real world via the observed objective 
facts (or the data), in particular repetitive events.  
 
As Richard von Mises wrote:  
 
“By means of the methods of abstraction and idealization 
(…) a system of basic concepts is created upon which a 
logical structure can then be erected. Owing to the 
original relation between the basic concepts and the 
observed primary phenomena, this theoretical structure 
permits us to draw conclusions concerning the world of 
reality.”12  
 
In the logical approach to be examined in the next 
section, probability theory is seen as a branch of logic, 
as an extension of deductive logic to the inductive case. 
In contrast to this view, the frequency approach sees 
probability theory as a mathematical science, such as 
mechanics, but dealing with a different range of 
observable phenomena. Probability should thus not be 
interpreted in an epistemological sense. It is not lack 
of knowledge (uncertainty) which provides the foundation 
of probability theory, but experience with large numbers 
of events. 
A probability theory which does not introduce from 
the very beginning a connection between probability and 
relative frequency is not able to contribute anything to 
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the study of reality.13 A key question raised by this view 
relates to how mathematical sciences relate to the 
empirical material with which they are concerned. Since 
Richard von Mises was an empiricist, the starting point 
for him was always some observable phenomenon such as an 
empirical collective. In fact, according to the random 
frequency definition it is possible to speak about 
probabilities only in reference to a properly defined 
collective. Probability has a real meaning only as 
probability in a given collective. The basis of Richard 
von Mises´ theory of probability is thus the concept of a 
collective. The rational concept of probability, as 
opposed to probability as used in everyday speech, 
acquires a precise meaning only if the collective to 
which it applies is defined exactly in every case. 
Essentially a collective consists of a sequence of 
observations which can be continued indefinitely. Each 
observation ends with the recording of a certain 
attribute. The relative frequency with which a specified 
attribute occurs in the sequence of observations has a 
limiting value, which remains unchanged if a partial 
sequence is formed from the original one by an arbitrary 
place selection.14 
To deal with such phenomena, we obtain by 
abstraction or idealization some mathematical concepts, 
such as, in this instance, the concept of mathematical 
collective. We next establish on the basis of observation 
some empirical laws which the phenomena under study obey. 
Then again by abstraction or idealization we obtain from 
these empirical laws the axioms of our mathematical 
theory. Once the mathematical theory has been set up in 
this way, we can deduce consequences from it by logic, 
and these provide predictions and explanations of further 
observable phenomena. 
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Applying this scheme to the case of probability 
theory, there are, according to Richard von Mises, two 
empirical laws which are observed to hold for empirical 
collectives. The first of these can be named the Law of 
Stability of Statistical Frequencies; it refers to the 
increasing stability of statistical frequencies and is 
designated by Richard von Mises as “the ‘primary 
phenomenon’ (Urphänomen) of the theory of probability”.15  
 
As Mises explains: 
 
“It is essential for the theory of probability that 
experience has shown that in the game of dice, as in all 
the other mass phenomena which we have mentioned, the 
relative frequencies of certain attributes become more 
and more stable as the number of observations is 
increased.”16 
 
The first law of empirical collectives was fairly 
well known before Richard von Mises. The second law, 
however, is original to him and it relates to a decisive 
feature of a collective. This feature of the empirical 
collective is its lack of order, that is, its randomness. 
Richard von Mises´ ingenious idea is that we should 
relate randomness to the failure of gambling systems.  
As he wrote: 
 
“The authors of such systems have all, sooner or later, 
had the sad experience of finding out that no system is 
able to improve their chances of winning in the long run, 
i.e., to affect the relative frequencies with which 
different colours or numbers appear in a sequence 
selected from the total sequence of the game.”17 
 
In other words, not only do the relative frequencies 
stabilize around particular values, but these values 
remain the same if we choose, according to some rule, a 
subsequence of our original (finite) sequence. This 
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second empirical law can be called the Law of Excluded 
Gambling Systems. 
The next step in Richard von Mises´ programme is to 
obtain the axioms of the mathematical theory by 
abstraction (or idealization) from these empirical laws. 
The first axiom can be easily obtained from the Law of 
Stability of Statistical Frequencies:  
 
 
Axiom of convergence: 
 
Let A be an arbitrary attribute of a collective C which 
is obtained m times in n trials, then 
lim n→∞ m(A)/n exists. The probability of A in C [P(A/C]) 
is now defined as lim n→∞ m(A)/n. This is the famous 
limiting frequency definition of probability. 
 
One of the main objections to this theory is that it 
is too narrow, for there are many important situations 
where we use probability but in which nothing like an 
empirical collective can be defined. In particular this 
definition is too narrow in the context of economics. 
This was the viewpoint of important economists such as 
Ludwig von Mises, John Maynard Keynes and John Hicks. 
Nevertheless Richard von Mises considers this 
alleged disadvantage to be a strong point in favour of 
his theory. We can, according to Richard von Mises, start 
with the imprecise concepts of ordinary language but when 
we are constructing a scientific theory we must replace 
these by more precise concepts. Thus we can of course 
start with the vague ordinary language concept of 
probability, but for scientific purposes it must be made 
precise by a definition. This is done by the limiting 
frequency definition of probability. This definition 
excludes some ordinary language uses of probability for 
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which a collective cannot be defined, but this is no bad 
thing. On the contrary, it is positively beneficial to 
exclude some vague uses of probability which are 
unsuitable for mathematical treatment. Summing up this 
line of argument, he writes: 
 
“`The probability of winning a battle´, for instance, has 
no place in our theory of probability, because we cannot 
think of a collective to which it belongs. The theory of 
probability cannot be applied to this problem any more 
than the physical concept of work can be applied to the 
calculation of the `work´ done by an actor in reciting 
his part in a play.”18 
 
The limiting frequency definition of probability is 
supposed to be an operational definition of a theoretical 
concept (probability) in terms of an observable concept 
(frequency). It could be claimed, however, that it fails 
to provide a connection between observation and theory 
because of the use of limits in an infinite sequence. It 
is well known that two sequences can agree at the first n 
places for any finite n however large and yet converge to 
quite different limits. A similar objection relates to 
the question of whether the representation of a finite 
empirical collective by an infinite mathematical 
collective is legitimate.  
Richard von Mises´ answer to this difficulty is that 
such representations of the finite by the infinite occur 
everywhere in mathematical physics, and that his aim is 
only to present probability theory in a fashion which is 
as rigorous as the rest of mathematical physics. In 
mechanics, for example, we have point particles to 
represent bodies with a size, infinitely thin lines to 
represent lines with a finite thickness, and so on. 
Richard von Mises argues that he is trying to present 
probability theory as a mathematical science like 
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mechanics, but it is unreasonable to expect him to make 
it more rigorous than mechanics. As he 
wrote: 
 
“… the results of a theory based on the notion of the 
infinite collective can be applied to finite sequences of 
observations in a way which is not logically definable, 
but is nevertheless sufficiently exact in practice. The 
relation of theory to observation is in this case 
essentially the same as in all other physical sciences.”19  
 
To complete Richard von Mises´ programme, it must be 
examined how the second mathematical axiom - the axiom of 
randomness - can be obtained from the empirical Law of 
Excluded Gambling Systems. It turns out that the 
formulation of the axiom of randomness does involve some 
rather considerable mathematical difficulties. Even if 
these were eventually overcome, the quite subtle 
mathematical developments which finally gave Richard von 
Mises´ theory a rigorous mathematical foundation, are of 
little relevance in the present context. The main idea is 
reminded here, however:  
 
Randomness condition: 
 
The fixed limits to which the relative frequencies of 
particular attributes within a collective tend are not 
affected by any place selection, that is, by choosing an 
infinite sub-sequence whose elements are a function of 
previous outcomes. That is, if we calculate the relative 
frequency of some attribute not in the original sequence, 
but in a partial set, selected according to some fixed 
rule, then we require that the relative frequency so 
calculated should tend to the same limit as it does in 
the original set.  In this respect Richard von Mises made 
the following stipulation:  
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“The only essential condition is that the question 
whether or not a certain member of the original sequence 
belongs to the selected partial sequence should be 
settled independently of the result of the corresponding 
observation, i.e., before anything is known about this 
result.”20   
 
An important implication of Richard von Mises´ 
frequency theory is that, when dealing with unique 
events, statistical or stochastic methods will be 
essentially useless. Where collectives do not exist, 
probability theory and the calculations based on it will 
add nothing to our knowledge concerning the world of 
reality. Only where previous experience has established 
that events can be considered as belonging to a 
collective, can statistical methods play a role. The 
calculations of insurance companies for instance 
demonstrate that stochastic methods play a legitimate 
role in certain kinds of business decisions, namely when 
dealing with events belonging to a collective. The theory 
of probability starts with certain given frequencies and 
derives new ones by means of calculations carried out 
according to certain established rules. In other words, 
each probability calculation is based on the knowledge of 
certain relative frequencies in long sequences of 
observations, and its result is always the prediction of 
another relative frequency, which can be tested by a new 
sequence of observations. The task of the theory of 
probability is thus to derive new collectives and their 
distributions from given distributions in one or more 
initial collectives.21  
 
Richard von Mises´ limiting frequency definition of 
probability was clearly intended to limit the scope of 
the mathematical theory of probability, and, in fact, of 
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the scientific concept of probability.22 We can only, he 
claims, introduce probabilities in a scientific sense – 
which here also means: in a mathematical or quantitative 
sense – where there is a large set of uniform events, and 
he urges us to observe his maxim: “First the collective – 
then the probability”.23, 24 
Despite controversy it can be expected that the 
frequency theory of probability will remain significant 
for the conduct of natural science.25  
 
 
IV. John Maynard Keynes´ epistemic approach to 
probability: the logical interpretation 
 
  
The logical interpretation of probability considers 
probability as the degree of a partial entailment. 
Keynes´ Treatise is concerned with the general theory of 
arguments from premisses leading to conclusions which are 
reasonable but not certain. Let e be the premisses and h 
the conclusion of an argument. Keynes holds that the 
familiar relation `e implies h´ is the limiting case of a 
more general (probability) relation `e partially implies 
h´. Keynes´ aim in the Treatise is to systematize 
statements involving such relations of partial 
implication. The logical theory uses the word 
“probability” primarily in relation to the truth of 
sentences, or propositions. 
 
It aims at assigning truth values other than zero or 
one to propositions. In this process, that part of our 
knowledge which we obtain directly, supplies the 
premisses of that part which we obtain indirectly or by 
argument. From these premisses we seek to justify some 
degree of rational belief about all sorts of conclusions. 
We do this by perceiving certain logical relations 
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between the premisses and the conclusions. The kind of 
rational belief which we infer in this manner is termed 
probable (or in the limit certain), and the logical 
relations, by the perception of which it is obtained, we 
term relations of probability.26  
 
 Comparisons are possible between two probabilities, 
only when they and certainty all lie on the same ordered 
series. Probabilities which are not of the same order 
cannot be compared. Only when numerical measurement of 
probabilities is possible, which is only occasionally 
possible and which is thus a matter for special enquiry 
in each case, algebraical operations such as addition and 
arithmetical multiplication, can be performed. The 
numbers zero and one figure as extreme cases. A 
probability of zero indicates impossibility, a 
probability equal to one indicates the truth of a 
proposition.   
The idea of a logic of probability which should be 
the art of reasoning from inconclusive evidence was 
systematically developed by John Maynard Keynes although 
hints towards this approach had been expressed at least 
since Leibniz. Keynes regards probability theory, like 
economics, as a branch of logic. Although Richard von 
Mises calls Keynes “a persistent subjectivist” 27, Keynes 
makes it clear at the beginning of his book that his 
theory is, in an important sense, an objective one. For 
Keynes probability was degree of rational belief not 
simply degree of belief. The relevant passage is worth 
being quoted in its entirety: 
 
“The terms certain and probable describe the various 
degrees of rational belief about a proposition which 
different amounts of knowledge authorise us to entertain. 
All propositions are true or false, but the knowledge we 
have of them depends on our circumstances; and while it 
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is often convenient to speak of propositions as certain 
or probable, this expresses strictly a relationship in 
which they stand to a corpus of knowledge, actual or 
hypothetical, and not a characteristic of the 
propositions in themselves. A proposition is capable at 
the same time of varying degrees of this relationship, 
depending upon the knowledge to which it is related, so 
that it is without significance to call a proposition 
probable unless we specify the knowledge to which we are 
relating it. 
To this extent, therefore, probability may be called 
subjective. But in the sense important to logic, 
probability is not subjective. It is not, that is to say, 
subject to human caprice. A proposition is not probable 
because we think it so. When once the facts are given 
which determine our knowledge, what is probable or 
improbable in these circumstances has been fixed 
objectively, and is independent of our opinion. The 
Theory of Probability is logical, therefore, because it 
is concerned with the degree of belief which it is 
rational to entertain in given conditions, and not merely 
with the actual beliefs of particular individuals, which 
may or may not be rational.” 28    
 
It is important to acknowledge the point for point 
disagreement which exists between the theories of Richard 
von Mises and John Maynard Keynes. 29 For Richard von 
Mises probability is a branch of empirical science; for 
Keynes it is an extension of deductive logic. Von Mises 
defined probability as limiting frequency; Keynes as 
degree of rational belief. For von Mises the axioms of 
probability are obtained by abstraction from two 
empirical laws; for the other they are perceived by 
direct logical intuition. On one point there seems to be 
some agreement. Neither thinks that all probabilities 
have a numerical value, but the attitude of the two 
authors to this situation is very different. For Richard 
von Mises only probabilities defined within an empirical 
collective can be evaluated and only these probabilities 
have any scientific interest. The remaining uses of 
probability are examples of a crude pre-scientific 
concept towards which he takes a dismissive attitude. For 
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Keynes on the other hand all probabilities are 
essentially on a par. They all obey the same formal rules 
and play the same role in our thinking. Certain special 
features of the situation allow us to assign numerical 
values in some cases, though not in general. Through the 
acknowledgement that frequency probability does not cover 
all we mean by probability, Keynes´ position is thus also 
closer to that of other economists such as Ludwig von 
Mises and John Hicks. Finally the position of statistics 
is different in the two accounts. For von Mises it is a 
study of how to apply probability theory in practice, 
similar to applied mechanics. For Keynes statistical 
inference is a special kind of inductive inference and 
statistics is a branch of the theory of induction.  
 
The most striking differences between John Maynard Keynes 
and Richard von Mises are thus: 
 
- according to Richard von Mises, the theory of 
probability belongs to the empirical sciences, based on 
limiting frequencies, while Keynes regards it as a branch 
of logic, based on degrees of rational belief; and 
 
- Richard von Mises´ axioms are idealizations of 
empirical laws, Keynes´ axioms follow from the intuition 
of logic.  
 
It is a quite remarkable fact that the practical 
significance of these differences in principles does not 
prevent the two authors from reaching nearly complete 
agreement on almost all of the mathematical theorems of 
probability, as well as on the potentially successful 
fields of application of statistics. Thus their complete 
disagreement on all the philosophical issues is 
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accompanied by complete agreement on the mathematical 
side. Moreover an essentially similar conclusion can be 
drawn as regards the potential scope of successful 
application of numerical probability concepts.  
Thus in Part V of the Treatise in the context of his 
discussion of statistical inference, Keynes has the great 
merit of noticing that the applicability of some of the 
essential parts of the classical doctrine assumes 
independence or irrelevance.30 
Keynes also suggested renaming the law of large 
numbers the Law of Stability of Statistical Frequencies, 
which provides a clear summary of its meaning: 
 
“But the ‘Law of Great Numbers’ is not at all a good name 
for the principle which underlies Statistical Induction. 
The ‘Stability of Statistical Frequencies’ would be a 
much better name for it. The former suggests, as perhaps 
Poisson intended to suggest, but what is certainly false, 
that every class of event shows statistical regularity of 
occurrence if only one takes a sufficient number of 
instances of it. It also encourages the method of 
procedure, by which it is thought legitimate to take any 
observed degree of frequency or association, which is 
shown in a fairly numerous set of statistics, and to 
assume with insufficient investigation that, because the 
statistics are numerous, the observed degree of frequency 
is therefore stable. Observation shows that some 
statistical frequencies are, within narrower or wider 
limits, stable. But stable frequencies are not very 
common, and cannot be assumed lightly.” 31   
 
According to the frequency view the successful 
application of probability theory, in particular for 
purposes of statistical inference, is conditioned by the 
fulfillment of a particular presupposition: in a 
particular domain of reality, one or more collectives 
exist as a matter of fact. This means that adequate 
applications of the laws of large numbers rest on a 
supposition of homogeneity with respect to the phenomena 
which are subjected to study.  
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Quite remarkably Keynes, when examining the validity 
and conditions of applicability of Bernoulli´s Theorem 
and its Inversion, arrives at similar conclusions. 
 
As he wrote: 
 
“If we knew that our material world could be likened to a 
game of chance, we might expect to infer chances from 
frequencies, with the same sort of confidence as that 
with which we infer frequencies from chances.” 32 
 
These reservations are similar to those expressed by 
several Austrian economists. For instance Ludwig von 
Mises clearly doubts whether the empirical Law of 
Stability of Statistical Frequencies is operative in 
social reality: 
 
“However, what the statistics of human actions really 
show is not regularity but irregularity. The number of 
crimes, suicides, and acts of forgetfulness (…) varies 
from year to year. These yearly changes are as a rule 
small, and over a period of years they often – but not 
always – show a definite trend toward either increase or 
decrease. These statistics are indicative of historical 
change, not of regularity in the sense which is attached 
to this term in the natural sciences.” 33 
 
 
V. Richard von Mises versus Ludwig von Mises, with 
respect to probability 
 
 
In this section a certain amount of evidence is 
presented which is drawn from Ludwig von Mises´ writings 
and which is difficult to square with the thesis that 
Ludwig von Mises embraced what is basically the frequency 
interpretation of probability of his brother Richard von 
Mises.  
It is remarkable that some of Ludwig von Mises´ most 
revealing statements about the nature and meaning of the 
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concept of probability relate to a context which is alien 
to economic science proper. If there is one field of 
scientific enquiry where the nature and interpretation of 
the probability calculus have been the subject of much 
and reiterated debate, it is the domain of quantum 
mechanics and the philosophy of quantum mechanics. We 
have already noted at the end of section III that, 
controversy notwithstanding, the frequency interpretation 
remains highly significant for the conduct of natural 
science. Here we turn our attention more particularly to 
a comparison of Ludwig von Mises´ concept of class 
probability with Richard von Mises´ concept of frequency 
probability. 
 
The writings of Ludwig von Mises contain many 
important insights with respect to the philosophy of the 
sciences and it is not quite surprising that he had an 
outspoken opinion about the matter. In Theory and 
History, in a section entitled Determinism and 
Statistics, he expressed his view with respect to quantum 
mechanics as follows: 
 
“Quantum mechanics deals with the fact that we do not 
know how an atom will behave in an individual instance. 
But we know what patterns of behavior can possibly occur 
and the proportion in which these patterns really occur. 
While the perfect form of a causal law is: A “produces” 
B, there is also a less perfect form: A “produces” C in 
n% of all cases, D in m% of all cases, and so on. Perhaps 
it will at a later day be possible to dissolve this A of 
the less perfect form into a number of disparate elements 
to each of which a definite “effect” will be assigned 
according to the perfect form. But whether this will 
happen or not is of no relevance for the problem of 
determinism. The imperfect law too is a causal law, 
although it discloses shortcomings in our knowledge. And 
because it is a display of a peculiar type both of 
knowledge and of ignorance, it opens a field for the 
employment of the calculus of probability.” 34  
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Mises then provides the well-known definition of his 
concept of class probability: 
 
“We know, with regard to a definite problem, all about 
the behavior of the whole class of events, we know that A 
will produce definite effects in a know proportion; but 
all we know about the individual A´s is that they are 
members of the A class. The mathematical formulation of 
this mixture of knowledge and ignorance is: We know the 
probability of the various effects that can possibly be 
“produced” by an individual A.” 35   
 
Significantly Ludwig von Mises is also explicitly 
critical of the mainstream indeterminist interpretation 
of quantum mechanics since he pursues: 
 
“What the neo-indeterminist school of physics fails to 
see is that the proposition: A produces B in n% of the 
cases and C in the rest of the cases is, 
epistemologically, not different from the proposition: A 
always produces B. The former proposition differs from 
the latter only in combining in its notion of A two 
elements, X and Y, which the perfect form of a causal law 
would have to distinguish. But no question of contingency 
is raised.” 36   
 
In Human Action Ludwig von Mises raised similar 
concerns when he wrote: 
 
“The treatment accorded to the problem of causality in 
the last decades has been, due to a confusion brought 
about by some eminent physicists, rather unsatisfactory. 
(…) 
There are changes whose causes are, at least for the 
present time, unknown to us. Sometimes we succeed in 
acquiring a partial knowledge so that we are able to say: 
in 70 per cent of all cases A results in B, in the 
remaining cases in C, or even in D, E, F, and so on. In 
order to substitute for this fragmentary information more 
precise information it would be necessary to break up A 
into its elements. As long as this is not achieved, we 
must acquiesce in a statistical law.” 37   
 
 
These passages are important and interesting because 
they clearly illustrate the fact that in the context of 
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the well-known historical debate between physicists who 
believed that quantum mechanics is incomplete and who 
were tempted to assume that “God does not play dice”, on 
the one hand, and the physicists who, on the contrary, 
believed that the fundamental laws of nature are 
irreducibly probabilistic, on the other hand, Ludwig von 
Mises takes sides with the former.38 Ludwig von Mises 
clearly associates the use of the probability calculus 
with partial knowledge, that is, with ignorance and the 
imperfections of our knowledge, and not with the 
existence of any contingency in re. Similarly Einstein 
believed, from the very beginning, that quantum theory 
lacked some key ingredients and that, in a very 
significant sense, it was “incomplete”. He compared it 
with the theory of light before the advent of light 
quanta. Quantum theory, he believed, was perhaps a 
“correct theory of statistical laws”, but it provided “an 
inadequate conception of individual elementary 
processes.” 39  
Thus Ludwig von Mises´ concept of class probability, 
in contradistinction to the frequency concept of his 
brother Richard von Mises, contains a reference to the 
deficiency of our knowledge, that is, to the idea that 
any probability assignment describes only a state of 
knowledge. A statement is probable if our knowledge 
concerning its content is deficient.40 According to this 
view the use of statistical laws signals partial 
knowledge and fragmentary information. There do not exist 
any statistical laws in an objective, physical sense.  
As Popper reminds us too, the widely-held view that 
whenever probability enters our considerations, this is 
due to our imperfect knowledge, is reminiscent of 
subjective interpretations of the probability calculus.41 
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The objective frequency interpretation does not have this 
connotation.  
According to the mainstream view with respect to 
this matter, (nearly all) the probabilities appearing in 
theoretical quantum mechanics are indeed objective 
probabilities. That is to say, they inhere in the world 
and do not simply reflect the degrees of belief, or the 
degrees of knowledge, of an observer.42   
These remarks are sufficient to establish the fact 
that Ludwig von Mises´ interpretation of numerical 
probability theory, and in particular his interpretation 
of the concept of class probability, is in a fundamental 
sense distinct from that of his brother Richard von 
Mises. Indeed, according to Richard von Mises, the point 
of view that statistical theories are merely temporary 
explanations, in contrast to the final deterministic ones 
which alone satisfy our desire for causality, is nothing 
but a prejudice which is bound to disappear with 
increased understanding.43    
The contrast between the views of Ludwig von Mises 
and of Richard von Mises in this respect can also be 
related to the fact that Ludwig von Mises´ worldview, in 
contradistinction to that of his brother Richard von 
Mises, apparently exhibited some leaning towards 
metaphysical determinism.44  
 
It is true that the contrast between Ludwig von 
Mises´ concept of class probability and Richard von 
Mises´ notion of a collective remains somewhat concealed 
and thus runs the risk of going unnoticed because of the 
fact that on a few occasions Ludwig von Mises uses 
terminology which is reminiscent of the idea of 
“frequency”.  
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In Human Action for instance Ludwig von Mises explicitly 
and unambiguously characterizes the notion of class 
probability as a variant of frequency probability.45  
Nevertheless this terminological issue cannot 
invalidate our thesis that, all things considered, Ludwig 
von Mises´ philosophy of probability exhibits a closer 
affinity with an epistemological view – such as Keynes´ 
logical theory - than with the frequency view of his 
brother Richard von Mises. The conclusion at which we 
have thus arrived is nuanced. On the one hand Ludwig von 
Mises clearly relates the idea of probability to the 
state of knowledge of the knowing subject. This is true 
both of class probability and of case probability. A 
statement is probable if our knowledge concerning its 
content is deficient. This view is shared by all adepts 
of an epistemological interpretation of the concept of 
probability, including John Maynard Keynes. Richard von 
Mises, to the contrary, very explicitly rejects the idea 
that the concept of probability refers to a state of 
partial or deficient knowledge. On the other hand, Ludwig 
von Mises clearly recognizes that the meaning of 
probability is different according to the field of 
knowledge in which it is used or according to the kind of 
phenomena to which it is applied. He thus embraces a 
dualist view in the philosophy of probability.46 But in 
this respect his view is again clearly different from and 
opposed to that of his brother Richard von Mises who 
obviously embraces a monist theory of probability. 
Moreover, from the perspective of the logical theory 
of probability too, the concept of probability sometimes 
refers to relative frequency.  Contemporary adepts of the 
idea of probability theory as extended logic are 
confident that their approach can encompass frequentist 
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methods, but merely as only one specialized application 
of probability theory.47  
Apparently this was also Keynes´ view since he wrote 
that “the theory of this Treatise is the generalised 
theory, comprehending within it such applications of the 
idea of statistical truth-frequency as have validity.” 48   
 
In other words, on this view the problems that can 
be solved by frequentist probability theory form a 
subclass of those that are amenable to probability as 
logic; probability theory as logic, however, can also be 
applied consistently in many problems that do not fit 
into the frequentist preconceptions.   
 
It would be premature to conclude that such concerns 
about the meaning of probability as are raised by Ludwig 
von Mises have now become obsolete and unambiguously 
belong to the history of the philosophy of probability. 
As one adept of the logical interpretation of probability 
explained recently: 
 
“Probabilities in present quantum theory express the 
incompleteness of human knowledge just as truly as did 
those in classical statistical mechanics; only its origin 
is different. 
In classical statistical mechanics, probability 
distributions represented our ignorance of the true 
microscopic coordinates – ignorance that was avoidable in 
principle but unavoidable in practice, but which did not 
prevent us from predicting reproducible phenomena, just 
because those phenomena are independent of the 
microscopic details. 
In current quantum theory, probabilities express our 
ignorance due to our failure to search for the real 
causes of physical phenomena; and, worse, our failure 
even to think seriously about the problem. This ignorance 
may be unavoidable in practice, but in our present state 
of knowledge we do not know whether it is unavoidable in 
principle; the ‘central dogma’ simply asserts this, and 
draws the conclusion that belief in causes, and searching 
for them, is philosophically naïve. If everybody accepted 
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this and abided by it, no further advances in 
understanding of physical law would ever be made; indeed, 
no such advance has been made since the 1927 Solvay 
Congress in which this mentality became solidified into 
physics. But it seems to us that this attitude places a 
premium on stupidity; to lack the ingenuity to think of a 
rational physical explanation is to support the 
supernatural view.” 49   
 
 
Again a disagreement about the meaning of 
probability at the philosophical level need not preclude 
an approximate consensus regarding the legitimate scope 
of application of numerical probability theory. It is 
certainly doubtful whether the criterion of convergence 
and the conditions for the availability of a collective 
are ever satisfied in economic or econometric 
applications. Probabilities in economics are not the kind 
of physical entities that Richard von Mises seems to have 
had in mind in constructing his theory. 
The empirical foundation for probability in this 
sense, that is to say for objective frequency 
probability, will typically be lacking. Richard von Mises 
himself seems to have suggested that the frequentist 
conception is not applicable to the moral sciences owing 
to the absence of events meeting the conditions of a 
collective. As he wrote:  
 
“The unlimited extension of the validity of the exact 
sciences was a characteristic feature of the exaggerated 
rationalism of the eighteenth century. We do not intend 
to commit the same mistake.” 50    
 
On this point Ludwig von Mises and Richard von Mises seem 
to have agreed.  
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VI. More about Ludwig von Mises and John Maynard Keynes, 
with respect to probability  
 
 
Attention has already been drawn to the fact that 
both Ludwig von Mises and John Maynard Keynes embrace an 
epistemological rather than an objective interpretation 
of probabilities. Both of these authors also point to 
certain limits of the applicability of numerical 
probability, and in particular of the laws of large 
numbers. These authors´ respective views on probability 
have another important characteristic in common, however. 
Both authors recognize and acknowledge the 
epistemological and scientific legitimacy of qualitative, 
non-measurable probabilities.   
With respect to the question of whether a numerical 
measurement of probabilities is always possible, John 
Maynard Keynes was critical of the tendency to interpret 
probabilities as being, in general, numerically 
measurable. Thus he wrote: 
 
“The attention, out of proportion to their real 
importance, which has been paid, on account of the 
opportunities of mathematical manipulation which they 
afford, to the limited class of numerical probabilities, 
seems to be a part explanation of the belief, which it is 
the principal object of this chapter to prove erroneous, 
that all probabilities must belong to it.” 51   
 
In similar vein Ludwig von Mises wrote: 
 
“The problem of probable inference is much bigger than 
those problems which constitute the field of the calculus 
of probability. Only preoccupation with the mathematical 
treatment could result in the prejudice that probability 
always means frequency.” 52    
 
Ludwig von Mises, who distinguishes between two 
kinds of probability - class probability, which  
corresponds to frequency probability but 
epistemologically interpreted, and case probability - 
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accorded the second meaning of probability important 
scientific status. 
 
In Ludwig von Mises´ words:  
 
“Case probability means: We know, with regard to a 
particular event, some of the factors which determine its 
outcome; but there are other determining factors about 
which we know nothing.” 53    
 
Here too, however, the idea of probability relates 
to the general idea of partial or imperfect knowledge; in 
this respect, and only in this respect, case probability 
is indeed similar to class probability: 
 
“Case probability has nothing in common with class 
probability but the incompleteness of our knowledge. In 
every other regard the two are entirely different.” 54     
 
 
Keynes, while he does not adopt the terms case and 
class probability, believes, like Ludwig von Mises, that 
frequency probability does not encompass all we mean by 
probability. Clearly the random frequency definition of 
probability is too narrow to encompass what we mean when 
we use the term probability. We do say of unique events 
that they are more or less probable. Many decisions that 
people make daily are based on probability statements 
that have no frequency interpretation.  
 
In Chapter VIII of A Treatise on Probability, while 
discussing Venn´s elaboration of the frequency theory, he 
wrote: 
 
“It is the obvious, as well as the correct, criticism of 
such a theory, that the identification of probability 
with statistical frequency is a very grave departure from 
the established use of words; for it clearly excludes a 
great number of judgments which are generally believed to 
deal with probability.” 55   
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While the frequency theory of probability is 
concerned with a cardinally measurable degree of 
probability, case probability is not open to any kind of 
numerical evaluation according to Ludwig von Mises.56   
According to this view, case probability focuses on 
individual events which as a rule are not part of a 
sequence, and case probability is not measurable in any 
but an ordinal sense; there is no cardinal measure of 
case probability.  
What is commonly considered as a numerical 
evaluation of case probability, Mises argues, exhibits, 
when more closely scrutinized, a different character, 
viz. that of a metaphor. 57 When we proceed to a numerical 
evaluation of case probability, this amounts to an 
attempt to elucidate a complicated state of affairs by 
resorting to an analogy borrowed from the calculus of 
probability. As it happens, this mathematical discipline 
is more popular than the analysis of the epistemological 
nature of understanding. As has been pointed out already, 
a distinctive feature of Keynes´ view too is that not all 
probabilities are numerically measurable, and in many 
instances, they cannot even be ranked on an ordinal 
scale.58  
Keynes´ views on the applicability of large number 
statistics to singular propositions are in this respect 
somewhat similar to those espoused by Ludwig von Mises. 
Keynes was clear on why one might adopt case probability 
judgments even where large number statistics are 
available: 
 
“In some cases, moreover, where general statistics are 
available, the numerical probability which might be 
derived from them is inapplicable because of the presence 
of additional knowledge with regard to the particular 
case.” 59   
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VII. The distinctiveness of Ludwig von Mises´ position in 
the philosophy of probability 
 
 
 
Acknowledging certain similarities between Ludwig 
von Mises´ and John Maynard Keynes´ respective positions 
in the philosophy of probability should not blind us to 
the fact that their respective views also exhibit 
important differences. The most important of these 
relates to the fact that Ludwig von Mises advocates a 
pluralist, and in particular a dualist view of 
probability. According to a pluralist view of 
probability, there exist several different, though 
possibly interconnected, notions of probability which 
apply in different contexts, or with respect to different 
kinds of phenomena. Ludwig von Mises´ dualist position in 
the philosophy of probability is an aspect of his more 
general methodological dualism, which is based on a 
recognition of certain fundamental ontological, 
epistemological and methodological differences between 
the natural sciences on the one hand and the sciences of 
human action on the other, and between the natures of 
their respective subject matters. Moreover, in the 
particular case of Ludwig von Mises, his dualism in the 
philosophy of probability coincides with the distinction 
between measurable, numerical probability on the one hand 
and non-measurable, non-numerical probability on the 
other, that is, with the distinction between class 
probability and case probability.60, 61 
Ludwig von Mises´ solution to the problem of 
defining the concept of probability remains, no less than 
Keynes´, original and highly relevant. Where others have 
pleaded in favour of the introduction of operationalist 
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procedures in the social sciences, as an alternative way 
of making the qualitative quantitative 62, Ludwig von 
Mises´ concept of case probability remains radically non-
numerical, geared to the needs of historical and 
entrepreneurial understanding.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
While certain fundamental differences between the 
natural and the social sciences and the consequent need 
for a nuanced solution to the problem of finding an 
adequate definition of the concept of probability have 
been recognized by various authors and schools of 
thought, the solutions to this problem offered by both 
Ludwig von Mises and John Maynard Keyes remain both 
interesting from a theoretical perspective and useful 
from a more practical viewpoint.  
We have been entitled to conclude that Ludwig von 
Mises´ views concerning the interpretation of the concept 
of probability, as they can be ascertained from certain 
passages of his writings, are in some respects more akin 
to the logical interpretation of probability as developed 
by John Maynard Keynes than to the frequency view as 
developed by his brother Richard von Mises. Summarizing, 
it can be acknowledged that this conclusion is supported 
by the fact that the views of Ludwig von Mises and of 
John Maynard Keynes about the interpretation of 
probability – that is, their philosophy of probability – 
have two important characteristics in common which are 
not shared by the probability theory of Richard von 
Mises.    
First, both Ludwig von Mises and John Maynard Keynes 
adopt an epistemological (or epistemic) interpretation of 
probability, whereas Richard von Mises clearly embraces 
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an objective theory of probability. The viewpoints of 
Ludwig von Mises and John Maynard Keynes, in so far as 
they amount to an argument for interpreting probabilities 
in economics as epistemological rather than objective, 
are thus in agreement with the conclusions of recent 
research. Second, both Ludwig von Mises and John Maynard 
Keynes, in their respective ways, acknowledge the 
existence and the epistemological and scientific 
legitimacy of non-measurable (or non-numerical) 
probabilities, besides the usual measurable probabilities 
having a definite numerical value in the interval [0, 1]. 
Although Richard von Mises did acknowledge that there was 
an ordinary language or common sense notion of 
probability which was not covered by his frequency 
theory, he asserts that there is only one concept of 
probability that is of scientific importance. In other 
words, according to this view there is, in a scientific 
approach to the subject matter, no room for a purely 
qualitative notion of probability.  
While some authors have gone so far as to question 
the adequacy of the orthodox frequency theory even for 
the physical sciences, there is a somewhat greater amount 
of consensus in favour of the conclusions (1) that in any 
case an objective interpretation of probability such as 
the orthodox frequency theory is not wide enough for 
economics, and (2) that in economics a qualitative non-
numerical concept of probability is both needed and 
scientifically legitimate. Both of the aforementioned 
characteristics have much relevance for the conduct of 
social science in general and of economics in particular.  
An important difference between the views of Ludwig 
von Mises and those of John Maynard Keynes in this 
respect has nevertheless been acknowledged. Whereas 
Keynes advocated a monist view of probability and claimed 
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that his interpretation of probability applies to all 
uses of the concept, Ludwig von Mises, in accordance with 
his methodological dualism, embraced a dualist view, 
recognizing more emphatically the existence of important 
differences between the natural sciences on the one hand 
and the social sciences, including economics, on the 
other. The particular solution offered by Ludwig von 
Mises thus remains highly distinctive and sophisticated, 
even if in comparison with the Keynesian approach, it has 
until present received somewhat less attention.63 
   
Notes 
 
1
 See, for instance, Hoppe (2006), who assumes that Ludwig von Mises 
is a representative of the frequency interpretation of probability. 
Whether or not this author´s views on probability are defensible, it 
is not quite correct to impute these same views to Ludwig von Mises. 
Moreover we are unable to detect an essential or exclusive connection 
between Keynes´ economics and Keynes´ views on probability; therefore 
a rejection of Keynesian economics – see e.g. Hoppe (1992) – need not 
entail a rejection of Keynes´ views on probability. Attempts to forge 
a supposedly essential connection between a particular philosophical 
(ideological) or economic Worldview on the one hand and a particular 
interpretation of probability on the other, are not new.  
Thus, as is also pointed out in Lad (1983), the objective 
interpretation of probability seems to have been rather influential 
in Marxist-Leninist philosophy and in Soviet thought under the 
influence of the mode of thinking of the Russian probabilist B.V. 
Gnedenko, who wrote about the subjective characterization of 
probability that “[t]he final outcome of consistently using such a 
purely subjectivistic interpretation of probability is inevitably 
subjective idealism.” (2005 [1962], 25; also quoted in Lad (1983, 
286)). Against this interpretation, Lad (1983) argues that an 
operational subjective construction à la de Finetti is free of 
Gnedenko´s charges and fits Marxist philosophical presuppositions 
better. We do not expect any such attempts to be very convincing. 
2
 The logical, subjective and intersubjective interpretations are all 
epistemological. The frequency and propensity interpretations are 
objective. For a survey and discussion of the different 
interpretations, see Gillies (2000). 
3
 Rothbard (2004, 553) 
4
 Rothbard´s interpretation is questionable for at least two reasons. 
First, Ludwig von Mises embraces an epistemic interpretation of his 
concept of numerical class probability whereas Richard von Mises´ 
interpretation of the concept of frequency probability is objective. 
Second, whereas for Richard von Mises there is indeed only one 
scientific use of the term probability, from the perspective of 
Ludwig von Mises both the concept of class probability and the 
concept of case probability are scientifically legitimate. See 
further. For other references by Prof. Rothbard to Richard von Mises´ 
theory, see in particular Rothbard (1997), 24n, 24-27, 122n, 229n. 
5
 Rothbard (1995, 38) 
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 Rothbard (1995, 38) 
7
 See Steele (2000). The Central Limit Theorem (in the classical 
sense) is the generic name of a class of theorems which give, in 
precise mathematical terms, conditions under which the distribution 
function of a suitably standardized sum of independent random 
variables is approximately normal. This theorem is one of the most 
remarkable results in all of mathematics. For an introduction to the 
Central Limit Theorem from a historical perspective, see also W. J. 
Adams (1974). 
8
 See Gillies (2000, 187 ff.). The main reason why objective 
probabilities cannot be validly introduced in economics is not too 
difficult to grasp and can be related to the impossibility of 
introducing a satisfactory notion of independent repetitions of 
conditions and of random and homogeneous samples. In a typical 
experimental situation in physics, a sequence of independent 
repetitions of the experiment is perfectly possible. The experiment 
can be performed in the same laboratory on different days, or in 
different laboratories on the same day etc., and these repetitions 
will typically be independent. The conditions necessary for the 
introduction of objective probabilities are satisfied. It might seem 
as if there exists a certain structural similarity between a typical 
situation in economics and the typical experimental situation in 
physics. The two cases nevertheless differ in important respects. 
Could we not conceivably use observations of the behavior and 
performance of economic systems as samples of independent repetitions 
of conditions similar to the ones present in the typical experiment 
in physics? The different samples could be taken from either (1) data 
related to the same economic system at different times, or (2) data 
related to different economic systems at a similar stage of 
development. One author who recently re-examined these questions 
aptly summarizes his answer to this question as follows: “In the 
first case, if the samples refer to ‘snapshots’ of the economy which 
are too close together in time, it is hard to maintain that the more 
recent performance is not influenced by that of the previous periods; 
thus the independence of the samples cannot be maintained. If the 
samples relate to historical periods far enough from each other to 
render the assumption of independence plausible, one is unlikely to 
get homogeneous samples; thus invalidating the ‘experiment’. In the 
second case the use of a sample of cross-section data would still not 
give independence as economic systems tend to be integrated in terms 
of trade and production, and particularly as the flow of information 
from one country is likely to affect the behavior of agents in 
others.” See Gillies (2000, 192). This view with respect to the 
interpretation of probability is thus apparently dictated by the 
fundamentally different nature of the phenomena under study in the 
realm of human action, when compared with physical phenomena. Acting 
individuals in a market economy are very different from, say, the 
molecules of a gas. Since an economic system is composed of acting 
individuals, who have thoughts and beliefs, an independent repetition 
of any situation becomes difficult if not impossible. 
9
 In this respect attention can be drawn to the influence of B.V. 
Gnedenko, author of the often revised and reprinted Theory of 
Probability containing an objective characterization of chance and at 
once the most complete statement of the Soviet Marxist understanding 
of probability. See also Footnote 1 above and the discussion in Lad 
(1983). 
10 These correspond by and large - although not exactly - to Carnap´s 
two concepts of probability: probability as used in logic (degree of      
confirmation) on the one hand, and probability as used in statistical 
and physical science (relative frequency), on the other. See Carnap 
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[1921]); for our analysis of Richard von Mises´ views we will use 
Richard von Mises (1981 [1957]) and (1964).    
11
 Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 30) 
12
 Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], v) 
13
 Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 63) 
14 On the concept of collective, see also Mises (1964, 11-15). As 
explained further, a collective is a mass phenomenon or an unlimited 
sequence of observations fulfilling two conditions, the convergence 
condition and the randomness condition. According to Richard von 
Mises, many types of repeatable experiment generate collectives, or 
at any rate would do so if they could be continued indefinitely. The 
task of statistics is to identify which experiments have this 
collective-generating property and to elicit the associated 
probability distributions over their class of possible outcomes. The 
task of probability calculus in mathematical statistics consists in 
investigating whether a given system of statistical data forms a 
collective, or whether it can be reduced to collectives. Such a 
reduction provides a condensed, systematic description of the 
statistical data that may properly be considered an “explanation” of 
these data. See Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 222).  
15
 Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 14). In fact, the expression 
“Stability of Statistical Frequencies” is Keynes´; see Keynes (2004 
[1921], 336).   
16
 Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 12) 
17
 Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 25) 
18
 See Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 15). Regarding his positivist 
ideas Richard von Mises was much influenced by E. Mach whom he 
greatly admired. See Richard von Mises (ibid., 225) where he writes: 
“The point of view represented in this book corresponds essentially 
to MACH´s ideas.” See in this connection also Richard von Mises 
(1951, passim). 
19
 See Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 85). The practical difficulty 
arises from the fact that a collective is defined for an infinite 
sequence. A collective is an idealization. Strictly speaking, no 
relative-frequency probability statement says anything about any 
finite event, group of events or series. In other words, any 
calculated frequency is perfectly consistent with any probability 
attribution from zero to one. Combined with the injunction that there 
is no such thing as a probability of a “singular” event, it would 
appear that any definitive empirical attribution of numerical 
probabilities is a chimera. A statement about the limit of a sequence 
of trials hypothetically continued to infinity contains by itself 
absolutely no information about any initial segment of that sequence. 
Any initial segment of a collective - and we are, of course, only 
ever capable of observing initial segments - can be replaced with any 
arbitrary sequence of the same length without affecting any of the 
limits in the collective. Richard von Mises acknowledges that “[i]t 
might thus appear that our theory could never be tested 
experimentally”. (ibid. 84) His probabilistic solution to this 
problem is a pragmatic one. The empirical validity of the theory does 
not depend on a logical solution, but is determined by a practical 
decision. This decision should be based on previous experience of 
successful applications of probability theory, where practical 
studies have shown that frequency limits are approached comparatively 
rapidly. Moreover the idealization of the collective is comparable 
with other well-known idealizations in science, such as the 
determination of a specific weight (perfect measurement being 
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impossible), the existence of a point in Euclidean space, or the 
concept of velocity. 
The velocity of an accelerating object at a moment in time is the 
ratio of the change in distance to the change in time, ds/dt. This 
ratio changes as dt changes, and if we wish to avoid the 
embarrassment of having our velocity depend on the time used to 
calculate it, we must let dt grow infinitely small,  
i.e., v = lim ds/dt.  
          dt→0 
                                                                                    
It is impossible to verify that this limit exists. It does not 
follow, however, that the concept of velocity is non-operational. 
This criticism would duplicate the criticism of probability as the 
limit of a sequence, but it would not be considered a serious 
objection, because the definition of velocity as a limit has proven 
itself to be applicable to many different instances of motion, in 
just the same way the frequency theory has been successfully applied 
to many instances. The relation of theory to observation in the 
latter case is essentially the same as in all other physical 
sciences. It is reminded here that Ludwig von Mises´ definition of 
class probability, which is discussed further, is finitist in the 
sense that it dispenses entirely with any reference to the concept of 
a limit. In that limited sense it can be considered that Ludwig von 
Mises´ definition of class probability constitutes an improvement 
upon the definition of a collective offered by Richard von Mises.  
20
 See Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 25). As indicated already, the 
fulfillment of the second condition, insensitivity to place 
selection, is also described by Richard von Mises as the Principle of 
the Impossibility of a (successful) Gambling System. (ibid.) 
21
 The derivation of a new collective from the initial ones consists 
in the application of one or several of the four fundamental 
operations of selection, mixing, partition and combination. See 
Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], Second Lecture; 1964, 15-35). 
As regards the frequentist solution to the problem of inference given 
by Richard von Mises, it consists of a combination of the frequency 
concept of a collective with Bayes´ theorem, a result known as the 
‘Second Law of Large Numbers’. (ibid. 125) Bayes´ formula shows a 
relationship between prior and posterior probability functions. If 
knowledge of the prior distribution does exist, there is no 
conceptual problem with the application of Bayes´ theorem. Often the 
prior probability function will not be known, however, and it is then 
an important part of probability theory to know what influence the 
prior probability function has in the calculation of the posterior 
distribution. In general the following will hold: no substantial 
inference can be drawn from a small number of observations if nothing 
is known a priori, that is, preliminary to the experiments, about the 
object of experimentation. If the prior distribution is not known, 
and the number of observations, say rolls of a die, is small, then 
the posterior distribution will not allow to draw any conclusions 
accurately. On the other hand, a large number of observations limits 
the importance of knowing the prior distribution. As long as the 
number of experiments is small, the influence of the initial 
distribution predominates; however, as the number of experiments 
increases, this influence decreases more and more.  
Often the prior distribution will not be known. The actor will then 
have to guess at a distribution, sample the population, and then 
revise his guess according to Bayes´ formula. This means that actions 
of an individual will also be guided by the accuracy of his or her 
guess. 
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22
 As he wrote: “Our probability theory has nothing to do with 
questions such as: `Is there a probability of Germany being at some 
time in the future involved in a war with Liberia?´” See Richard von 
Mises (1981 [1957], 9). 
23
 Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 18) 
24
 Richard von Mises thus advocated a monist view of probability, 
that is, he asserts that there is only one concept of probability 
that is of scientific importance, in contradistinction to his brother 
Ludwig von Mises who espoused a dualist view of probability. 
25
 For recent testimony of this fact, see e.g. Khrennikov (1999). 
This author argues that certain problems in the foundations of 
quantum mechanics – such as the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox – are 
connected with the foundations of probability theory and thus have a 
purely mathematical origin. In particular, the pathological (or non-
classical) behaviour of “quantum probabilities” – in particular 
Bell´s inequality - is a consequence of the formal use of 
Kolmogorov´s probability model. This author uses the ensemble and 
frequency interpretations as the two fundamental interpretations of 
probability and arrives at surprising results.  Bell´s inequality 
cannot be used as an argument for non-locality or non-reality. 
Historically, and although it has been argued that the philosophical 
background of subjective probability strongly resembles that 
underlying quantum mechanics (see Galavotti 1995), it is frequentism 
that became the “received view” of probability and seems to have been 
tacitly assumed also by the upholders of the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics (although the attribution of 
probabilities to the single case was generally admitted). In this 
context attention has often been drawn to Heisenberg´s viewpoint 
according to which “(t)he probability function combines objective and 
subjective elements. It contains statements about possibilities or 
better tendencies (“potential” in Aristotelian philosophy), and these 
statements are completely objective, they do not depend on any 
observer; and it contains statements about our knowledge of the 
system, which of course are subjective in so far as they may be 
different for different observers. In ideal cases the subjective 
element in the probability function may be practically negligible as 
compared with the objective one. The physicists then speak of a “pure 
case”.” See Heisenberg (1958 [1990], 41), and also the discussion in 
Galavotti (1995). 
26
 See Keynes (2004 [1921], 111). Keynes mostly takes the empiricist 
line that knowledge acquired by direct acquaintance constitutes true 
and certain knowledge. Knowledge by argument, in contrast, proceeds 
through direct knowledge of relations of the form `e implies h´ or `e 
partially implies h´. 
27
 Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 94) 
28
 See Keynes (2004 [1921], 3-4). It is widely held that Keynes 
yielded to Ramsey´s (1988) critical arguments and that he abandoned 
the idea that rational beliefs are founded on logical relations of 
partial implication and accepted instead that they are closer to our 
perceptions and our memories than to formal logic. As Runde (1994) 
points out, Keynes´s theory of comparative probability emerges 
unscathed. On the one hand Ramsey´s theory embodies strong implicit 
presuppositions of its own and is in certain respects a considerably 
more idealistic construction than Keynes´s. On the other hand, 
Keynes´s emphasis is on incompleteness and on the fact that 
numerically definite probabilities can only be determined in 
situations which approximate games of chance.       
29
 See also Gillies (1973, 14-5). 
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30
 As Keynes writes: “It is assumed, first, that a knowledge of what 
has occurred at some of the trials would not affect the probability 
of what may occur at any of the others; and it is assumed, secondly, 
that these probabilities are all equal à priori. It is assumed, that 
is to say, that the probability of the event´s occurrence at the rth 
trial is equal à priori to its probability at the nth trial, and, 
further, that it is unaffected by a knowledge of what may actually 
have occurred at the nth trial.” (2004 [1921], 344) 
As Karl Popper points out, the theory of independence or irrelevance 
is equivalent to the law of the excluded gambling system. See Popper 
(1983, 299).  
31
 Keynes (2004 [1921], 336) 
32
 Keynes (2004 [1921], 384-5) Significantly, Keynes also wrote in 
connection with the application of Bernoulli´s formula: “In cases 
where the use of this formula is valid, important inferences can be 
drawn; and it will be shown that, when the conditions for objective 
chance are approximately satisfied, it is probable that the 
conditions for the application of Bernoulli´s formula will be 
approximately satisfied also.” (ibid. 290) 
33
 See Ludwig von Mises (1969 [1957], 84-5). See also (1978 [1962], 
56) where Mises wrote: “There is no such thing as statistical laws.” 
According to this view, statistics is rather a sub-discipline, or an 
auxiliary discipline, of historiography.  
34
 Ludwig von Mises (1969 [1957], 87-8) 
35
 Ludwig von Mises (1969 [1957], 88) 
36
 Ludwig von Mises (1969 [1957], 88) 
37
 Ludwig von Mises (1998, 22) In The Ultimate Foundation of Economic 
Science Ludwig von Mises also wrote: “There is always in science some 
ultimate given. For contemporary physics the behavior of the atoms 
appears as such an ultimate given. The physicists are today at a loss 
to reduce certain atomic processes to their causes. One does not 
detract from the marvelous achievements of physics by establishing 
the fact that this state of affairs is what is commonly called 
ignorance.”(1978 [1962], 23)  
38
 In particular quantum theory is irreducibly probabilistic. Unlike 
classical probabilities, quantum probabilities do not reflect our 
ignorance of the intricate details of some underlying physical 
reality. In particular Einstein disliked the element of chance 
implied by quantum theory. In a letter to Max Born, dated 4 December 
1926, he wrote: “Quantum mechanics is very impressive. But an inner 
voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory produces 
a good deal but hardly brings us closer to the secret of the Old One. 
I am at all events convinced that He does not play dice.” Quoted in 
Baggott (2004, 34). Reference can in this context also be made to the 
confrontation between Einstein and Bohr over the interpretation of 
quantum theory, and to subsequent debates along similar lines, and 
which have often been portrayed in the past as a direct conflict 
between realism and positivism. For a good survey and discussion of 
these issues see also Baggott (2004). The issue for Einstein indeed 
seems to have been realism rather than determinism. Ludwig von Mises 
is apparently on the realist side. For a sophisticated analysis of 
Einstein´s views in this respect, see also Fine (1986); Einstein´s 
remark about the dice-playing God (“…ob der liebe Gott würfelt”) is 
also related in Bohr (1949, 218); see also Fine (1986, 29).  
39
 Einstein, Albert, letter to Sommerfeld, Arnold, dated 9 November 
1927. Quoted in Fine, A. (1986), p. 29.   
40
 Ludwig von Mises (1998, 107) 
41
 Popper (1983, 295) 
 42
42
 See Hughes (1992, 218). The possible exceptions occur when a 
system is in a mixed state. Under the ignorance interpretation of a 
given mixture, a subjective probability is assigned to each of the 
pure states represented in it, and each of these in turn assigns 
objective probabilities to events. Not all mixtures can be given the 
ignorance interpretation, however. The interpretation of quantum 
states is a matter of much debate. For a discussion of pure and mixed 
states, see van Fraassen (1991, ch. 7).   
43
 See Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 223). As Richard von Mises 
writes: “The assumption that a statistical theory in macrophysics is 
compatible with a deterministic theory in microphysics is contrary to 
the conception of probability expressed in these lectures. Modern 
quantum mechanics or wave mechanics appears to be a purely 
statistical theory; its fundamental equations state relations between 
probability distributions.” (ibid. 223) The incompatibility with the 
views expressed by his brother Ludwig von Mises in this respect 
cannot be clearer. Therefore we do not share the view of an author 
who explains the absence of any reference in Ludwig von Mises´ Human 
Action to Richard von Mises´ frequency interpretation with reference 
to a supposed “estrangement” between the two brothers. See Hoppe 
(2006, 13). Clearly the two brothers disagreed on philosophical 
grounds. 
44
 See e.g. Ludwig von Mises (1978 [1962], 115). Turning back to 
quantum mechanics, it may be noted that the American-born physicist 
David Bohm has formulated in the 1950s an alternative interpretation 
of quantum mechanics that is fully deterministic (although non-
local). The very idea of probability enters into this theory as some 
kind of an epistemic idea, just as it enters into classical 
statistical mechanics. Despite all the advantages of Bohm´s theory, 
an almost universal refusal even to consider it, and an almost 
universal allegiance to the standard formulation of quantum mechanics 
has persisted in physics throughout most of the past 50 years.   
45
 Ludwig von Mises (1998, 107) 
46
 Accordingly probability sometimes involves a reference to the 
notion of relative frequency, but relative frequency is not the 
general defining characteristic of the scientific concept of 
probability according to Ludwig von Mises.   
47
 See Jaynes (2003, passim).  
48
 Keynes (1921 [2004], 104) 
49
 See Jaynes (2003, 328-9). In particular, this author´s views 
contrast sharply with those of Popper. With respect to the situation 
in physics, Popper, who argues for the compatibility of indeterminism 
with realism and objectivism, has gone so far as to blame the 
determinist interpretation of classical physics, or rather, what he 
characterizes as some unconscious determinist prejudice with respect 
to classical physics, for the subjective theory of probability and 
its consequence, the invasion of mysticism, irrationalism etc. into 
physics. See Popper (1982, passim).  
50
 See Richard von Mises (1981 [1957], 9).  
51
 Keynes (2004 [1921], 37) 
52
 Ludwig von Mises (1998, 107) 
53
 Ludwig von Mises (1998, 110) 
54
 Ludwig von Mises (1998, 110) 
55
 Keynes (2004 [1921], 95) 
56
 Ludwig von Mises (1998, 113-5) 
57
 See Ludwig von Mises (1998, 114). Ludwig von Mises´ view regarding 
this matter is thus distinct from the view of Bayesians such as 
Howson and Urbach who argue that choices of personal fair betting 
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quotients can provide a basis for making numerical assessments of 
uncertainty. See Howson and Urbach (2006, 51 ff.).  
58
 In the Treatise Keynes illustrates this point with the famous 
example of the “beauty contest”. (2004 [1921], 25 ff.) 
Keynes explains how one of the candidates of the contest sued the 
organizers of the Daily Express for not having had a reasonable 
opportunity to compete. Readers of the newspaper determined one part 
of the nomination. The final decision depended on an expert, who had 
to sample the top fifty of the ladies chosen by the readers.  The 
candidate complained in front of the Court of Justice, that she had 
not obtained an opportunity to make an appointment with this expert. 
Keynes argues that the chance of winning the contest could have been 
measured numerically, if only the response of the readers (who sent 
in their appraisals and thus provided an unambiguous ranking of the 
candidates) had mattered. The subjective taste of the single expert 
could not be evaluated in a similar way. Hence, a rational basis for 
evaluating the chances of the unfortunate lady was lacking. 
Keynes concludes: 
“Whether or not such a thing is theoretically conceivable, no 
exercise of the practical judgment is possible, by which a numerical 
value can actually be given to the probability of every argument. So 
far from our being able to measure them, it is not even clear that we 
are always able to place them in an order of magnitude. Nor has any 
theoretical rule for their evaluation ever been suggested.”(ibid. 27-
8)   
59 See Keynes (2004 [1921], 29). In similar vein, Hoppe (2006), 
analyzing the meaning of Ludwig von Mises´ concept of case 
probability, points out that the method of Verstehen can be 
characterized as a method of place selection, or a method of 
individualization.  
60
 It is not the case that according to Ludwig von Mises´ dualist 
(two-concept) view with respect to probability, the different 
concepts of probability are conceived of as different interpretations 
of the same mathematical calculus, or as applications of the same 
mathematical calculus to different sets of phenomena, as is the case 
according to certain other dualist views of probability. The 
distinction between class probability and case probability is 
ultimately based upon the different kind of cognitive accessibility 
of human actors in contrast to non-communicative entities. See Hoppe 
(2006).     
61
 Ludwig von Mises´ view with respect to the meaning of probability 
may thus seem to occupy a truly unique place in the philosophy of 
probability. Another economist who adopted a nuanced viewpoint in 
this connection is John Hicks. This author wrote: “I have myself come 
to the view that the frequency theory, though it is thoroughly at 
home in many of the natural sciences, is not wide enough for 
economics.” (1979, 105) Hicks is contrasting two interpretations of 
probability – the frequency and the logical. The framework used here 
is wider since we distinguish objective theories of probability from 
epistemological theories. 
62
 See Gillies (2000, 200 ff.). 
63
 Those contemporary Austrian economists who acknowledge the 
usefulness of modern data analysis methods for the conduct of applied 
research in economics can be confident that the now more and more 
widespread practice of interpreting probabilities as merely 
epistemological is in general agreement with Ludwig von Mises´ 
approach to probability. Moreover, it is neither clear nor obvious 
why a recognition of the usefulness of modern data analysis methods 
would have to amount to a denial of the essential importance of the 
method of understanding or Verstehen.  
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